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RECENT DECISIONS
Bankruptcy-Effect of State Statutes of Limitation-A Vir-
ginia corporation filed on February 23, 1942, in the Federal District
Court of Virginia, a petition for reorganization under Chapter X of the
Bankruptcy Act. Subsequent investigation resulted in suit by the
trustee in a federal district court of New York against the corpora-
tion's majority stockholder-Williams-and one of its directors,
charging breach of fiduciary duty in some thirteen transactions which
occurred in 1927 and 1929. The trustee alleged that Williams had
retained his dominant status for fifteen years, thus concealing the
breach of fiduciary duty until the trustee took over in 1942. Against a
defense that the statute of limitations as interpreted in New York had
run, the trustee contended that the suit having been brought in the
federal courts, the federal equitable interpretation as to when a state
statute of limitations began to run should control. Held: For the
defendants. Where a federal court has jurisdiction by virtue of a
federal statute directing it to apply state law as well as federal law, the
statute must be interpreted in accordance with congressional intent and
state-created rights adjudicated with respect to appropriate state law,
including the interpretation of state statutes by state courts. Judge
Clark dissented. Austrian v. Williams, 198 F.2d 697 (1952) Cert.
denied 73 S.Ct. 328 (1952).
The problem of what law is applicable to suits brought in the federal
courts regarding state-created rights has long confronted the American
lawyer. Judicial decision seems to have established three general prin-
ciples regarding suits brought in the federal courts. First, where the
jurisdiction of a federal court is based upon federally-created rights or
federal questions, both federal substantive and procedural law are to be
applied.1 Second, where federal jurisdiction is based upon diversity of
citizenship and state-created rights are at issue, federal procedural law
and the state substantive law of the forum are to be applied.2 Third,
where federal jurisdiction is based upon a federal statute creating the
right to sue in the federal courts upon a state-created right, but the
I Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) ; National Metro-
politan Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454 (1945); Holmberg v. Armbrecht,
327 U.S. 392 (1946): United States v. Standard Oil, 332 U.S. 301 (1947);
Steela v. Kaiser, 81 F.Supp. 807 (1947).
2 Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Guarantee Trust Co. v. York. 326
U.S. 99 (1945); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. F.D.I.C., 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
In commenting upon the intent behind the Erie v. Tompkins decision, Justice
Jackson remarked that it was the intent of the court, "to secure in the federal
court in diversity cases the application of the same substantive law as would
control if the suit were brought in the courts of the state wherein the federal
court sits." Thus federal modification of state law in diversity cases is
precluded.
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statute directs that state law is to be applied in particular instances, the
federal statute is to be construed in accordance with congressional intent
and state law is to be applied only in the manner and instances so
specified. 3 While this principle or rule has been recognized, the diffi-
culties that have arisen therefrom have been concerned with determining
"congressional intent" in the particular statute involved.
The problem of determining congressional intent in respect to Section
11 e4-covering statutes of limitations in bankruptcy proceedings-has
been particularly perplexing. Prior and subsequent to its adoption in
1938, there has been, with the exception of a brief paraphrasing of the
section, a complete absence of congressional comment upon 11 e.5 How-
ever, from the wording of the statute-occasioned by the disputeG over
the interpretation of its predecessor 11 d 7-as well as judicial decision,8
one thing is clear. The statute very definitely provides the trustee an
extension of time within which to bring suit. If a cause of action has
not expired at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition the
trustee is given a two year period in which to bring suit. Despite the
fact that the applicable statute of limitations may run out within that
two year period, the period is nevertheless extended two years from
the filing of the petition. If the particular state or federal law which
s Though no particular case contains an exact statement of the rule, this state-
ment of the rule may be derived from (1) the reluctance of the court in
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. F.D.I.C., 315 U.S. 447 (1942) to lay down a
general rule as to the possibility or the extent of federal modification of
state law when state-created rights are heard under a non-diversity juris-
diction; (2) the confinement of the Erie rule to diversity cases. D'Oench,
Duhme & Co. v. F.D.I.C., 315 U.S. 447 (1942); (3) the well established
principle that "the intent of the legislature, when properly ascertained, must
govern in the construction of every statute." Pollard v. Bailey, 20 Wall. 520
(U.S. 1874).
452 STAT. 849 (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. §29 e (1952). "A receiver or trustee may,
within two years subsequent to the date of adjudication or within such
further period of time as the Federal or State law may permit, institute pro-
ceedings in behalf of the estate upon any claim against which the period of
limitations fixed by Federal or State law had not expired at the time of the
filing of the petition in bankruptcy."
5 Except for a brief paraphrasing of the section the Senate and House reports
at the time of its enactment make no reference to 11 e. H.R. REP. 1409, 75th
Cong. 1st Sess. 20, 22 (1937); SEN. REP. 1916, 75th Cong. 3rd Sess. 14 (1938).
6 State and lower federal courts explicitly and uniformly held that its two year
limitation applied to all actions brought under the Bankruptcy Act itself but
did not supersede limitations on derivative actions arising under state law.
Davis v. Wiley, 273 Fed. 397 (9th Cir. 1921); Meilke v. Drain, 69 F.2d 290
(9th Cir. 1934). Other courts ruled that it was a superseding statute applying
to all actions brought by the trustee under state or federal law. Isaacs v.
Neece, 75 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1935); Callaghan v. Bailey, 293 N.Y. 396, 57 N.E.
2d 729 (1944). Other courts held that it did not supersede the state statutes
in adding any time to the period of limitation but rather, merely prohibited
actions by or against a trustee after the two year period. Narin v. McCarthy,
120 F.2d 910 (7th Cir. 1941) ; Cf. Harrigan v. Bergdoll, 270 U.S. 560 (1926).
730 STAT. L. 549 (1898) "Suits shall not be brought by or against a trustee
subsequent to two years after the estate has been closed."
8 Dabney v. Levy, 92 F.Supp. 551 (1950), aff'd., 191 F.2d 201 (1951), cert. den.,
342 U.S. 887 (1951) rehearing den., 342 U.S. 911 (1951).
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gives rise to the cause of action provides a longer period in which to
bring suit, the longer period prevails and the period prescribed by the
state statute is not limited by the two year regulation.9
Thus it appears evident that, while granting an extension of time
for bringing suit if the cause of action exists at the filing of the bank-
ruptcy petition, it is not the intent of Congress to allow suit on expired
causes of action.'0 However, in determining whether a cause of action
exists at the filing, the statute is not clear as to the meaning or applica-
tion of the term "state law."
The court in the instant case-applying 11 e-assumes that the term
"state law" means not only statutory law but also state decisional
interpretation and modification thereof. It further assumes that a
federal court is required to follow such interpretation. Thus the court,
considering itself bound to apply the New York rather than the federal
equitable interpretation" of the statute of limitation, decided that the
statute began to run at the time of the wrongful act in 1927, rather than
at its discovery in 1942, and held for the defendants.
At first glance, the present interpretation 2 of the Rules of Decision
Act"3-compelled by Erie v. Tompkins 4-- would make such an inter-
pretation a reasonable one. But to establish that interpretation of the
term "state law" as that intended by Congress in its adoption of 11 e
would be to disregard (1) the policy considerations motivating the
adoption of the section, and (2) its history.
9 The majority of cases decided under 11 e seem to bear out this statement of
the rule. See in particular, Herget v. National Bank & Trust Co. of Peoria,
141 F.2d 150 (7th Cir. 1944), aff'd., 324 U.S. 4 (1945) ". . . The meaning of the
statute seems quite simple-that when a cause of action has not already
expired at the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, a receiver may
sue within whichever is the longer of two periods, two years, or that provided
by the statute permitting or creating the cause." McBride v. Farrington, 60
F.Supp. 92 (Ore.D. 1945). "The new Sec. 11, Sub e, was obviously a com-
promise and extended the limitations laid down by the state statute . e . to a
fixed period of two years beyond the date of adjudication. It will be
noticed, however, that if the state statute provided for a term of limitation
which did not lapse until two years after adjudication that no change was
effected where the doctrines previously announced . . . continue in effect.
The purpose of the new act seems unquestionably to be to extend to the
trustee a fixed period within which he might file all suits which he has in-
herited from the debtor unless that it were the policy of the particular state
to give him even a longer time."
10 Supra, notes 4 and 9.
11 Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342 (U.S. 1875).
12 D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. F.D.I.C., supra, note 2, "Thus the Rules of Decision
Act as now interpreted require federal courts to use state law whether
declared by the legislature or by the courts as rules of decision 'in cases where
they apply' except where federal laws shall otherwise require or provide."
"3 62 STAT. 944 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. 1652 (1952), "The laws of the several states,
except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of
Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision
in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they shall
apply."
14 Erie v. Tompkins, supra, note 2.
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From a policy viewpoint two factors are noteworthy. First, after
the courts had exhibited considerable difficulty' 5 in agreeing upon the
interpretation of the negatively phrased 11 d16--which on its face
limited all actions by the trustee to a two year period following the
closing of the estate-Congress completely revamped the phraseology of
the section to provide in the positively phrased 11 e,' 7 a two year
extension of the period in which to bring suit. Though there has been
no congressional indication as to the motives behind the change 8 it may
be safe to assume that it was occasioned by the realization that to
efficiently carry out his duties, a trustee-at his appointment, unfamiliar
with the situation-requires greater time in which to discover and bring
suit on causes of action in favor of the bankrupt. From the fact that
the present 11 e extends the period for bringing suit where as its
predecessor 11 d sought to limit it, may be inferred the adoption of a
policy of allowing the trustee all possible opportunity for discovering
and prosecuting causes of action in favor of the bankrupt.
Secondly, the general policy of the Bankruptcy Act as regards the
powers of a trustee in a Chapter X reorganization proceeding, 9 seem
to indicate the feasibility of an interpretation of 11 e other than that
advanced in the instant case. While the ordinary trustee in bankruptcy
receives only those causes of action existing in favor of the bankrupt
or his creditors prior to the bankruptcy proceedings, a trustee in certain
instances may be given rights greater than those of the bankrupt or his
creditors in order to further particular policies.20 Thus the trustee in
reorganization is given broad investigatory powers for the purpose of
discovering causes of action which have, up to the time of the bank-
ruptcy proceedings, been successfully concealed. There is evidence that
at the time of the adoption of 11 e Congress was particularly con-
cerned about uncovering corporate management abuses-like those in
the instant case which are unlikely to be uncovered prior to reorganiza-
tion.2' Thus, the fact that Congress has given the trustee in reorgani-
zation broad investigatory powers as well as a duty to prosecute all
discovered causes of action indicate a congressional policy of aiding in
the exposure of corporate management abuses.
However, the result in the instant case under the present interpre-
15S pra, note 6.
16 Supra, note 7.
17 Supra, note 4.
'sSupra, note 5.
19 BANKRUPTcY Acr, §167, 52 STAT. 890 (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. §567 (1952).20 See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. F.D.I.C., supra, note 2; Board of Trade of
Chicago v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1 (1924) ; Prudence Realization Corp. v. Geist,
316 U.S. 89 (1942); Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green,
329 U.S. 156 (1946).
21 See Hearings Before Committee on the Judiciary in H.R. 6439 and H.R. 8046,
75th Cong. 1st Sess. 163-4, 175-6 (1937) ; H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess. 42-4 (1937) ; SEN. REP. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 21 (1938).
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tation of 11 e seems to be inconsistent with both the above mentioned
policies. First, in that the interpretation of the state statute of limitation
under the federal equitable doctrine would generally give the trustee
greater time to discover and prosecute any cause of action found in
favor of the bankrupt than would the state interpretation, a refusal to
follow the equitable interpretation seems inconsistent with the general
policy of 11 e. Second, in that the federal equitable interpretation
would toll the statute of limitation until discovery of the wrongful act,
whereas the New York state interpretation would not, a refusal to adopt
the federal equitable interpretation would be inconsistent with the grant
of wide investigatory powers to a trustee in reorganization. While the
trustee could still uncover corporate management abuses-by their very
nature so well hidden as to prevent discovery until the trustee's investi-
gation-the court's inability to apply the federal equitable interpretation
tolling the statute of limitation until such discovery-would lessen the
likelihood that such abuses would be remedied.
Section 11 e was passed by the House of Representatives in 193722
before the Erie v. Tompkins decision, 23 and by the Senate in 1938
shortly after the decision was handed down. 24 At the time the section
was proposed and passed by the House, the federal courts, following the
rationale of Swift v. Tyson,25 interpreted the Rules of Decision Act to
mean that while federal courts must apply state law where required,
state law meant that only the statutory law and not the non-statutory
law as contained in the judicial decisions of the state courts. Thus, the
federal courts, not being required to follow state decisional law, were
granted complete freedom to apply federal equitable doctrines where a
state's interpretation of a state statutory provision differed from the
federal equitable interpretation.
In the absence of any contrary expression of intent, we may reason-
ably conclude that in using the term "state law" in 11 e, Congress
intended that the term as then interpreted (1938) should apply and
that the federal courts are free to apply federal equitable interpretations
to state statutes of limitations in bankruptcy proceedings.
The policies which have extended the period for discovering and
bringing suit and which have been aimed at exposing corporate abuses
would seem to warrant that, if at all possible, any interpretation of the
statute of limitations which would extend a trustee's time for bringing
suit, should not be followed. There being no expression of congressional
intent that the federal courts should not be allowed to modify state
2 The Act passed the House on Aug. 10, 1937. 81 CONG. REC. 8649 (1937).
23 Erie v. Tompkins, supra, note 22, (decided April 25, 1938).
24The Act passed the Senate on June 10, 1938. 83 CONG. Rc. 8729 (1938).
25 Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (U.S. 1842); Kirby v. Lake Shore & Mich. S.R.R.,
120 U.S. 130 (1887).
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statutes of limitation, policy considerations would seem to warrant
allowing the federal courts in bankruptcy proceedings to impose federal
equitable interpretations upon state statutes of limitations.
The Supreme Court's recent denial of certiorari seems unfortunate
inasmuch as the Austrian decision cannot be justified on the grounds
that the interpretation of 11 e which formed the basis of the decision
was that intended by Congress. In addition thereto, the general policy
of the Bankruptcy Act aimed at extending the period in which to bring
suit would seem to warrant a contrary interpretation of 11 e.
GERALD A. FLANAGAN
Partnerships-The Nature of the Partnership before the Law-
In 1946 two persons formed a partnership to operate a Ford sales
and service agency. Two years later the same persons formed a second
partnership to sell and service tractors. Each partnership had its own
building, books, employees and bank account. All they had in common
were the two owners, the partners. The Ford agency employed enough
men to make it subject to the Michigan employment security act, but
the tractor agency did not. However, acting under advice from ap-
pellant, the partners included the employment of both firms on the same
report. By 1949, because of the good employment record of the two
firms, the partners' contribution rate for employment insurance was
only one per cent of the wages paid. At that time appellee purchased the
Ford agency from the partners, retaining the same employees. Appellant
raised the contribution rate of the Ford agency to three per cent on the
ground that the two partnerships had legally been but a single firm
because they were composed of the identical partners; that appellee
therefore was not a successor to the firm that had the one per cent
contribution rate, but to a distinct firm. Appellee won on an appeal
to a referee. This decision was affirmed by the appeal board and by
the circuit court, but the commission appealed. Held: Affirmed. A
partnership is a legal entity distinct from the individuals composing it.
Consequently, two partnerships with the same members are not a single
employing unit but must be considered separately. Michigan Employ-
ment Security Commission v. Crane et al. 334 Mich. 411, 54 N.W. 2d
616 (1952).
The decision of the principal case, that a partnership has a legal
existence distinct from its members, follows what is generally known
as the entity theory of partnerships. The contention of the appellant-
a partnership is not a distinct legal entity but an association of indi-
viduals-is known as the aggregate theory.' Whether a partnership is
]-Crane, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Criticism, 28 HARV. L. REv. 762
at 763 (1915).
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